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Market structure–driven discrimination and the earnings of 
subordinate managers: an analysis by union density 
 
 
 
Abstract: Recent work examines the market structure/racial earnings relationship for union and nonunion workers 
and finds that standardized union earnings protect black workers from market structure–driven earnings 
discrimination. This study examines the market structure/racial earnings relationship for low and mid-level 
managers in high- and low-union density industries. Our findings indicate that there is less market structure–driven 
discrimination of managers in highly unionized industries. We suggest that there is a spillover effect of reduced 
market structure–driven discrimination of managers in highly unionized industries that stems from standardized, 
more racially equitable wages of union workers. 
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Economists have a revived interest in agency problems and the ability of managers to engage in 
discretionary behavior (Williamson, 1963). Particularly, investigating the notion that profit in 
noncompetitive industries gives managers the latitude for increased discretionary spending—
resulting in excessive expenditure on workplace amenities 
(Edwards, 1977), excessive wages for workers, and racial wage discrimination (Becker, 1971). 
The theory implies that noncompetitive market structure provides managers the latitude to 
engage in preference-based, market structure–driven earnings discrimination. 
The theory premises on the notion that principals—business owners—have incomplete 
information, allowing agents—managers—to expend resources to indulge in wage 
discrimination. As a result, managers’ ability to engage in market structure–driven earnings 
discrimination of workers has been carefully scrutinized in the literature (Agesa and Monaco, 
2006; Coleman, 2004; Fujii and Trapani, 1978; Heywood, 1987; Johnson, 1978; Peoples, 1994). 
However, the market structure/discrimination literature loosely uses the term managers to refer 
to all levels of management as agents of discrimination. In reality, although the duties of low- 
and mid-level managers include hiring, firing, and determining the wages of workers, they are 
also subordinates to chief executives. Thus low- and mid-level black managers can also be 
victims of employer-based, market structure–driven discrimination, just as black workers can be 
victims. 
This study examines the effect of market structure on earnings discrimination of lower- and 
mid-level black managers. A thorough examination of market structure–driven discrimination of 
this group is warranted. Indeed, Becker (1971) postulates that employers’ tastes for 
discrimination might depend considerably on their contact with employees. Because subordinate 
managers work in close proximity to employers (presumably, closer proximity relative to 
workers), it is conceivable that they may be likely victims of preference-based, market structure–
driven discrimination. 
An understanding of market structure–driven discrimination of subordinate managers may also 
provide insights regarding scenarios in which they may be protected from it. Recent evidence 
finds that standardized union earnings protect black workers from market structure–driven 
earnings discrimination (Peoples, 1994). Thus if wage standardization from collective bargaining 
shields black workers in less-competitive industries from market structure–driven discrimination, 
then this study seeks to answer the question, is there a spillover effect of wage standardization 
and, therefore, less market structure–induced discrimination of black managers in highly 
unionized industries (relative to managers in less-unionized industries)? Such spillover effects 
are conceivable if internal labor markets are operable. Indeed, if internally promoted black 
managers experience standardized, less-discriminatory wages as union workers, then salaries free 
of market structure–driven discrimination would be necessary to entice them into management. 
As a result, we would expect less market structure–driven discrimination of black managers in 
highly unionized industries relative to less-unionized industries. 
 
Background 
 
The theory of market structure–driven discrimination 
 
Becker (1971) provides a theory of labor market discrimination that explains discrimination as 
a result of managers’ increased latitude for discretionary spending in noncompetitive markets. 
Specifically, intense pressure to reduce costs in fiercely competitive industries limits 
employers’ latitude to engage in market structure–induced discrimination, whereas the lack of 
product market competition in noncompetitive industries provides the latitude for market 
structure–driven discrimination to thrive. 
Many empirical exercises test this notion using either a single-industry or a multiple-industry 
approach. The single-industry approach has been used to examine the effect of deregulation on 
racial earnings in the motor carrier, airlines, rail, and telecommunications industries. See 
Heywood (1998) for a review of this literature. With the exception of the airline industry, 
single-industry studies find convincing evidence that enhanced competition reduces racial 
earnings discrimination; however, multiple- industry analyses of the relationship have met with 
mixed success. 
Johnson (1978) provides a multi-industry test of the relationship and finds that market 
concentration insignificantly influences the racial earnings gap in communications, utilities, 
and transportation industries. In that same year, Fujii and Trapani (1978) find no evidence that 
market concentration significantly influences earnings discrimination in manufacturing 
industries. A shortcoming of both of these studies is that industry categories are designated with 
broad, two-digit Standard Indus- trial Classification (SIC), which may conceal the variance from 
more precisely defined industries that otherwise could yield significant results. Heywood (1987) 
provides an analysis of the relationship performed after 1980, when new industry definitions were 
created to allow more narrow industry classification by three-digit SIC, and finds strong evidence 
to support the relationship. 
Peoples (1994) uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine the relationship—
emphasizing differences in the relationship for union and nonunion members—and finds no 
significant effect of market structure on the racial wage gap for union workers and a modest 
but consistently significant effect for nonunion workers. His findings support the contention that 
unions standardize earnings (Freeman, 1980). Particularly, Freeman (ibid.) contends that union 
solidarity is difficult to maintain if some workers are paid markedly more than others. Further, 
although union and nonunion enterprises employ similar formal wage-setting practices within 
each job category, the options for individual wage differentials are generally larger in the nonunion 
sector—suggesting that unionization leads to wage standardization. Moreover, Peoples’s (1994) 
findings provide evidence that unions’ standardized earnings protect black workers from market 
structure–driven discrimination. 
In the current analysis, findings that managers in high-union density industries experience wage 
standardization by race, gender, and education level would suggest that managers experience a 
spillover effect of wage homogeneity from union workers—evidence that is consistent with the 
notion of less market structure–induced discrimination of managers in highly unionized 
industries relative to less-unionized industries. 
A recent test of the relationship that allows a different wage structure for union and nonunion 
workers (separate wage equations) finds support for our hypothesis (Agesa and Monaco, 2006). 
Yet findings of recent studies that restrict the impact of market structure on racial wages to be the 
same for union and nonunion workers find less convincing evidence (Agesa and Hamilton, 2004; 
Coleman, 2004); for instance, Agesa and Hamilton’s (2004) test of the relationship utilizes the 
Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS), which provide no control for union membership. To 
compensate for the lack of union controls, they proxy union status with union density in one 
specification of their estimation of racial wage disparity. Notwithstanding, this method and each 
of their specifications, restrict the wage-determining process to be the same for workers in high- 
and low-union density industries. 
The specification used by Coleman (2004) consists of a single equation for union and nonunion 
members with a union status control. Moreover, given the different structure of earnings for union 
and nonunion workers, the ability of Coleman’s (ibid.) or Agesa and Hamilton’s (2004) single- 
equation approach to accurately gauge market structure’s differential impact for union and 
nonunion workers is problematic. In the current examination of market structure–driven 
discrimination of managers, we allow separate wage equations for managers in high- and low-
union density industries. Such a procedure allows a different wage structure for managers in the 
two union density groups, thereby allowing a unique impact of market structure on racial wages 
for each group. 
 
Managers and market structure–driven discrimination 
 
Analyses of market structure–driven discrimination of workers provide some evidence that 
noncompetitive market structure allows firms more latitude to discriminate relative to firms in 
competitive industries. However, Becker (1971) suggests that employers’ taste for 
discrimination might depend considerably on their contact with employees. Thus, the close 
proximity of low- and mid-level managers to employers indicates a need to examine market 
structure–driven discrimination of this group. 
It might be useful to examine a scenario in which market structure–induced discrimination of 
workers may extend beyond wage-earning employees to salaried, low- and mid-level 
managers. Internal labor markets are labor markets such that workers are hired into entry level 
jobs and higher levels are filled from within. Workers enter or leave a firm through ports of 
entry and exit, with incumbents having priority with regard to internal promotion (Doeringer 
and Piore, 1971). Lazear and Oyer (2004) suggest that when internal labor markets are operable, 
wages are also determined internally, and may be free of market pressure. Moreover, theories of 
discretionary power suggest that the lack of product market competition in noncompetitive 
industries gives firms the latitude to pay above-market wages and the latitude to engage in market 
structure–driven discrimination (Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). Thus, rents in noncompetitive 
industries may provide a particularly fruitful arena for supra-competitive wages generated in 
internal labor markets—at the same time providing the means for market structure–driven 
discrimination. 
Lazear and Oyer (2004) propose a scenario of internal promotion in which workers are 
perfect substitutes for one another and workers rise within organizations based on seniority, 
nepotism, influence, and discrimination. In such a scenario, wages need not move very closely 
with market wages. Conceivably, internally promoted managers in less- competitive industries 
may be indoctrinated into a system where wages are not market driven and whites 
disproportionately benefit from the rents from less-competitive market structure. In such a 
scenario, market structure–driven discrimination could transcend up the job ladder to low- and 
mid-level black managers. 
In external labor markets, workers move somewhat fluidly between firms and wages are 
determined by a market process, where firms do not have significant discretion over wage 
setting (ibid.). Such market- determined wage setting is consistent with wage determination in 
highly competitive markets, where fierce competition mandates that employers be more efficient 
in the distribution of wage payments. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that intense product 
market competition serves another purpose—reducing market structure–driven discrimination 
(Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). Conceivably, externally hired managers in competitive industries 
may be indoctrinated into a system where fierce competition mandates that employers be more 
efficient and racially equitable in the distribution of wage payments. In such a scenario, racially 
equitable wages may transcend up the job ladder to low- and mid-level black managers in 
competitive industries. 
Although, low- and mid-level managers are not usually covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, it is conceivable that wage standardization in highly unionized, less-competitive 
industries protects black managers from market structure–driven earnings discrimination. We 
utilize the hypothetical case of black union workers who are internally promoted to 
management. In union shops, workers are indoctrinated into a system where standardized, racially 
equitable wages are the norm. Conceivably, wages free of market structure–driven discrimination 
would be necessary to attract internally promoted black union workers to management, and the 
practice of paying less discriminatory wages would transcend up the job ladder to low- and mid-
level black managers. 
Although there are many theories to explain internal labor markets, empirical exercises have 
produced few indisputable conclusions (Baker and Holmstrom, 1995). Most internal labor market 
studies utilize personnel data to investigate the allocation of workers and their wages. See Lin 
(2005) for a comprehensive review of this literature. The current study does not examine the 
correlation between the occurrence of internal labor markets and market structure–driven 
discrimination. We simply point out that less-competitive market structure provides an ideal 
scenario for each of these inefficient labor market processes to flourish. This study examines the 
effect of market structure on earnings discrimination of lower- and mid-level black managers. 
Further, given recent evidence that standardized earnings of collective bargaining protect black 
workers from market structure–driven discrimination, we seek to determine if there is less 
market structure–driven discrimination for managers in highly unionized industries relative to 
less-unionized industries. We suggest that the lack of market structure–driven discrimination in 
highly unionized industries stems from the standardized and more racially equitable wage-
determining process of unionized workers. 
 
Data 
 
To test the above hypothesis, we use data taken from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORGs) 
1995–2000 of white and black male managers, age 16 and over, employed in manufacturing 
industries (National Bureau of Economic Research [NBER], 2005). 1 As managers are observed 
twice in CPS ORGs files, we omit their second observation. Because our analysis is of wages of 
low- and mid-level managers, 588 managers with top-coded wages are also removed from the 
data set. 
We match individual manager’s three-digit Census Industry Code (CIC) with industry-
level data on four-firm market concentration, the capital–labor ratio, and plant size taken from 
the 1997 Census of Manufacturers (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997). We convert industry characteristics 
from five-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to three-digit CIC by 
weighing industry value of shipments. The capital-to-labor ratio (K/L) is calculated as 
expenditure on capital divided by industry employment. Plant size (plant size) is industry 
employment divided by number of establishments. Four-firm industry concentration ratios serve 
as our measure of product market competition; however, with some limitations. First, because the 
Census consolidates only four-firm concentration ratios for manufacturing industries into a readily 
accessible format, we limit our analysis to managers in manufacturing industries. However, 
because the manufacturing sector constitutes a small portion of the U.S. workforce (currently 
about 15 percent), this analysis does not provide a complete picture of the effects of market 
concentration on racial earnings for all workers in the labor market. Also, because industry 
concentration is a national statistic, it does not capture local or regional competitiveness (Agesa 
and Hamilton, 2004). Notwithstanding these limitations, four-firm concentration is the typical 
measure of firm concentration used in analyses of industry market concentration and labor 
market outcomes. 
 
1 Ideally, we would have liked to use the annual March CPS files (NBER, 2005) for this analysis because they provide data on 
managers’ annual salaries, a more accurate earnings measure for this group. However, because of the limited sample size of the 
March files, there were too few observations in each race, union density, and market structure cell to permit the measurement of 
differences in racial earnings for each subgroup. 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of the wages of managers in our sample and their real hourly 
earnings (in 2000 dollars) by manager type and race. In many manager categories, blacks are 
paid less than their white counterparts. The exceptions are financial managers, personnel training 
managers, and purchasing agents. However, the number of black managers in each of these 
categories is small enough such that outliers may extremely bias average earnings. 
 
Table 1 
Wages of low- and mid-level managers in manufacturing industries: CPS ORGs, 1995–2000 
 
Average real hourly wage* 
 
 
Type of manager Blacks Whites 
 
Financial managers 30.72 29.77 
 (6) (390) 
Personnel and labor relations managers 16.09 27.24 
 (12) (248) 
Purchasing managers 11.97 25.85 
 (4) (210) 
Advertising and public relations managers 22.73 32.48 
 (33) (1,066) 
Managers and administrators 23.70 31.76 
 (196) (7,015) 
Management analysts 26.15 41.62 
 (12) (258) 
Personnel training manager 23.38 21.78 
 (32) (348) 
Purchasing agents 21.17 18.40 
 (24) (700) 
Management-related occupations 19.65 25.47 
 (9) (319) 
Total number 328 10,554 
Notes: *Real hourly wages are in 2000 dollars. Occupations are by three-digit occupation code. The number of individuals in the 
category of managers is indicated by the number in parentheses. Top-coded earners are eliminated. 
 
 
Table 2 presents a summary of black representation and average hourly earnings of managers 
by market structure, union density, and wage levels. Blacks are underrepresented in management 
but especially in higher wage management positions. Particularly, black representation is 3 
percent and 2.4 percent in high- and low-density industries, respectively, and the average wage 
of blacks is $23.12 and $22.08, respectively. Yet blacks represent roughly 5 percent in each 
union density group in the lowest earnings quartile and only 0.5 percent in the highest quartile. 
Moreover, the findings of fairly equal black representation in high- and low-density industries 
suggest little spillover effects of worker unionization in reducing market structure–initiated 
employment discrimination of managers. 2 
 
Methodology 
 
A switching regression technique is used to bifurcate managers into high-concentration, less- 
 
 
2Table 2 also indicates that black representation is highest in high-wage, less competitive industries (average wage $24.81, 3.8 
percent black) relative to low-wage, less-competitive industries (average wage $22.74, 2.5 percent black)—indicating that 
without controls for union density, there is no evidence of market structure–driven employment discrimination. 
Table 2 
Percent black and average hourly wage of managers in manufacturing, 1995–2000 
 
 
Less competitive Competitive 
 
 
 
All managers 
Percent Average  Percent Average 
black hourly wage  black hourly wage 
3.78 24.81  2.54 22.74 
 
High-union density Low-union density 
 Percent 
black 
Average 
hourly wage 
 Percent 
black 
Average 
hourly wage 
All managers 3.01 23.12  2.45 22.08 
0–25th quintile 5.01 18.07  4.39 17.94 
25th–50th quintile 2.61 21.57  1.63 21.64 
50th–75th quintile 2.79 25.55  2.00 25.40 
75th–100th quintile 0.47 29.83  0.45 29.51 
Source: CPS ORG 1995–2000 (NBER 2005) with top-coded earners eliminated. 
 
 
 
 
competitive industries and low-concentration, competitive industries. The critical concentration 
is 50 percent. 3 As a result, industries with four-firm concentration ratios equal to or exceeding 50 
percent are classified as “less-competitive,” whereas those lower than this threshold are 
designated as “competitive.” 
To estimate the relationship between market structure and racial wages for managers in the period 
1996 to 2000, we utilize ordinary least squares (OLS). Specifically, 
 
ln(wagei) = a + bX + cY + dZ + f(black) + g(less-competitive)  
+ h(black*less-competitive) + ui,      (1) 
 
where ln(wagei) is the log of hourly wages of managers in 2000 dollars, X is a matrix of 
managers’ attributes, Y is a matrix of industry characteristics, and Z is a matrix of year and 
quarter time controls. Manager attributes include dummies for marital status (married and 
separated, divorced, or widowed, with single managers as the omitted group), region 
(northeast, north central, south, with west as the omitted group), an urban dummy (cmsa), 
education dummies (high school diploma, some college, college degree, graduate degree, with 
managers with less than a high school diploma as the omitted group), and veteran status as well 
as age and its square. Dummy variables for the type of manager are included (administrators and 
finance managers, managers and administrators, advertising and public relation managers,  
purchasing agents and personnel training managers, with other managers as the omitted group). 
The broad categories of managers reveal a shortcoming of using the CPS ORG for this analysis. 
The CPS utilizes three-digit occupational coding—sometimes producing large, heterogeneous 
 
3A critical concentration of 50 percent is substantially lower than the critical concentration of 65 percent found in previous 
studies that utilize the Census of Manufacturers for 1982, 1987, and 1992 (Heywood, 1987; Peoples, 1994). The lower critical 
concentration found in the switching procedure used in this analysis is the result of fewer high-concentration manufacturing 
industries in the United States. 
categories under a single occupational code. In our analysis, “managers and administrators” are a 
particularly large category of low- and mid-level managers in manufacturing industries. Indeed, 
the category “managers and administrators” consists of 7,211 observations and roughly 66 
percent of all managers in our sample (see Table 1). Further, recent evidence suggests that this 
group of managers has particularly heterogeneous wages (Helwege, 1992). Thus, the use of 
broad dummy variable occupational categories to control for manager types in wage regressions 
could distort our findings of the market structure/discrimination relationship. 
Industry-level variables in our regression (matrix Y) include plant size and the capital–labor 
ratio. The matrix of time controls includes a dummy variable for each year and quarter 
combination from 1995 to 2000 to account for yearly and quarterly changes in macroeconomic 
conditions (with the first quarter of 1995 as the omitted group). 
The variables of particular interest to this study are the dummy variables for black racial status 
(black), less-competitive market structure (less-competitive), and the interaction of the two 
(black*less-competitive). The coefficient on the variable black, f, captures the black/white wage 
differential for managers in competitive industries. If this coefficient is negative, it provides 
evidence of earnings discrimination of managers in competitive industries. The coefficient on 
less-competitive, g, captures the change in earnings for white managers as a result of employment 
in less-competitive industries. If white managers are the beneficiaries of a portion of the rents in 
less-competitive industries, then we would expect this coefficient to be positive. 
The interaction term, black*less-competitive, captures the differential effect of market 
structure on the racial wage differential of managers. If less-competitive market structure allows 
more latitude for wage discrimination against subordinate managers, then we would expect the 
coefficient to be negative. Moreover, the sum of coefficients f and g provides the 
measurement of the black/white wage differential for subordinate managers in less-competitive 
industries. It is important to note that our earnings specification assumes that there is no racial 
sorting into unionized industries. Thus, our measure of labor market discrimination is limited to 
gauging wage discrimination. 
We next separate managers in manufacturing into two groups by the union density of the 
workers in the managers’ three-digit CIC industry.4 Specifically, managers in industries with 
union density at or above the median union density for each year are designated in high-union 
density industries, with managers in industries with density below the median are designated in low-
density industries. 5 We then estimate Equation (1) separately for managers in high- and low-union 
density industries—allowing a different impact of market structure on racial earnings for 
managers in the two union density groups. 
Wage equations estimated by OLS reveal how market structure affects the black/white wage 
gap of the average manager, providing no information regarding market structure’s effect on 
the wage gap along the distribution of earnings. We utilize quantile regressions, as they provide 
 
4 Data on union density by three-digit CIC are taken from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). 
5 The median industry union densities are 17.6, 16.9, 15.7, 16.2, 16.3, and 15.5 for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, 
respectively. 
 
a less restrictive estimation procedure that allows the measurement of marginal effects of 
covariates on the earnings of managers at different points along the distribution of managers’ 
earnings (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The quantile regression procedure estimates the θth quantile 
of the log of hourly earnings of managers (y) conditional on covariates (ibid.). We perform 
quantile regressions separately for managers in high- and low-union density industries. We use 
these results to test whether market structure’s effect on the earnings gap differs for managers at 
different earnings levels in high- and low-union density industries. Standard errors that are robust 
against arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity of the error distribution are obtained by 
bootstrapping (Buchinsky, 1994). 
 
Results 
 
The racial wage gap of managers in competitive and less-competitive industries 
 
Table 3 presents the racial wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries and the 
difference in the racial wage gap under the two market structures for the subgroups of all 
managers and managers in high- and low-union density industries, respectively. The racial wage 
gap in competitive industries is derived from the coefficient on black in Equation (1), where 
significance is determined by a t-test of the coefficient for each subgroup. The interaction term 
measures the differential wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries and is 
indicated by the added differential column in Table 3 for each subgroup. Moreover, the added 
differential directly tests Becker’s (1971) theory for each group of managers, as it captures the 
added racial wage gap in less-competitive industries relative to the gap in competitive industries. 
Specifically, if less-competitive market structure promotes increased racial wage gaps, then 
Becker’s assertion is true for that subgroup. The racial wage gap in less-competitive industries is 
derived from the sum of the coefficients on black and black*less-competitive in Equation (1) 
and significance is determined by an F-test of joint significance for each subgroup. The 
complete OLS results for each subgroup are available from the authors on request. 
The top portion of Table 3 indicates that black managers in competitive industries earn 16.6, 
14.2, and 17.7 percentage points less than their white counterparts overall and in high- and low-
union density industries, respectively.6 These findings reveal a smaller racial wage gap in 
competitive industries in highly unionized industries relative to low-union density industries—
findings consistent with wage standardization by race in highly unionized industries. The added 
wage differential in less- competitive industries is insignificant for all managers and those in high- 
and low-union density industries, respectively, indicating that the racial wage gap is 
insignificantly larger in less-competitive industries relative to competitive industries for all 
managers and managers in high- and low-union density industries. 
Adding the racial wage gap in competitive industries (the coefficient on black) and the added 
differential for each subgroup (the coefficient on the interaction) yields the black/white wage 
gap for managers in less-competitive industries for that subgroup. We utilize an F-test of the 
 
6 The marginal impact of a characteristic on the wage of the group in question is found by taking the exponential of the estimated 
coefficient minus one and multiplying by 100. 
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joint significance of these variables and find a significant racial wage gap of 37.2 percentage 
points for managers in low-union density, less-competitive industries. Because the added wage 
gap in less-competitive industries relative to competitive industries is insignificant in each 
specification, our OLS results find no support for Becker’s hypothesis. However, an 
examination of the differences in the magnitude of the wage gap in less-competitive industries 
in high- and low-union density industries (0.1666 and 0.3718, respectively) foreshadows 
differences in market structure–driven discrimination of black managers that will be exposed 
utilizing quantile regression. 
 
Quantile estimates in high-union density industries 
 
The lower portion of Table 3 provides a summary of quantile regression estimates of the racial 
wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries and the added racial wage differential 
between the two market structures. Results for managers in high-union density industries are 
presented on the left. The black/white wage gap in high-union density, competitive industries is 
7.6, 11.9, 14.9, and 15.6 percentage points at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth 
quantiles, respectively. The added differential in less-competitive industries is significant for 
managers in the twenty-fifth quantile—indicating that less-competitive market structure 
increases the racial wage gap of low-salary managers in highly unionized industries by 19.6 
percentage points relative to the gap in competitive, highly unionized industries. An F-test for 
the joint significance of black and black*less-competitive reveals a significant racial wage gap 
of 27.2 percentage points of managers in highly unionized, less-competitive industries at the 
twenty-fifth quantile. However, the added differentials are small and insignificant for managers 
in the median through ninetieth quantile—suggesting there is no substantial difference in the 
racial wage gaps for medium and high salary managers in competitive and less-competitive 
industries. These findings provide little support for Becker’s hypothesis for managers in highly 
unionized industries. 
 
Quantile estimates in low-union density industries 
 
The lower right portion of Table 3 provides a summary of quantile regression estimates of the 
racial wage gap in low-union density industries in competitive and less-competitive industries. 
The racial wage gap in competitive, low-union density industries is 22.3, 16.0, 15.4, and 17.8 
percentage points for managers at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth quantiles, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that at each level of the earnings distribution, the racial 
wage gap in competitive industries is consistently higher in low-union density industries relative 
to high-union density industries (comparing columns 2 and 5 of Table 3). 
The consistently smaller racial wage gap for managers in competitive, highly unionized 
industries relative to the gap for their counterparts in competitive, low-union density industries 
provides support for the notion that standardized union wages that reduce earnings disparity of 
union workers (Freeman, 1980) have an additional effect of reducing earnings disparity of 
managers in highly unionized industries. 
The added racial wage differential in less-competitive industries tests Becker’s hypothesis at 
each quantile for managers in low-union density industries (column 6). We find a significant 
difference in the racial wage gap in competitive and less-competitive industries of 37.0, 17.7, 
and 27.0 percentage points for managers at the twenty-fifth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth 
quantiles. These findings provide support for the notion that in low-union density industries, 
less-competitive market structure provides increased latitude for racial earnings discrimination 
against black managers. 7 Moreover, quantile estimates of the black/white wage gap for 
managers in low-union density, less-competitive industries are presented in column 7. We find 
a significant racial wage gap of 59.3, 22.4, 33.1, and 44.7 percentage points for managers at the 
twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth quantiles, respectively. 
It is worthy of mention that market structure–driven discrimination of managers in low-
union density industries displays no distinguish- able pattern by earnings level. For instance, 
the differential impact of market structure on the racial earnings gap is smallest at the median 
quantile, then it increases for higher wage managers; yet, the impact is largest for workers at the 
twenty-fifth quantile. The erratic pattern of market structure–driven discrimination by wage 
levels for low-union density industry managers is in contrast to recent work that reveals a 
systemic pattern for nonunion workers (Agesa and Monaco, 2006). 8  
The contrasting finding by wage level for workers and managers may stem from this study’s 
inability to distinguish managers by the actual unionization of workers in their shop utilizing 
CPS data. Thus, we employ a feasible second-best alternative—separating managers into two 
groups by the union density of workers in the managers’ three-digit CIC industry 
classification. Moreover, our approach lacks precision in connecting managers to the union 
status of their workers and, therefore, may not completely capture the pattern of market structure 
discrimination by wage level. 
Notwithstanding, our analysis provides convincing evidence of less market structure–induced 
discrimination of black managers in highly unionized industries relative to managers in less-
unionized industries. We suggest that internal labor markets in low-union density, less-competitive 
industries may promote preference-based, market structure–driven earnings discrimination, 
whereas market-dictated efficiency in competitive industries is consistent with external 
promotion. 
 
The returns to education of managers in high- and low-union density industries 
 
The returns to education, as indicated by the coefficients on the education categories in 
 
7 In separate analyses not shown (but available on request), OLS and quantile wage regressions were run for black and white 
female managers in high- and low-union density manufacturing industries. The goal was to test for market structure–driven racial 
earnings discrimination for female managers at different wage levels. Thus, the exact specifications that are outlined in our 
methodology section were run for female, black, and white managers. We find little evidence of market structure racial earnings 
discrimination for females. Further, dividing the data into high- and low-union density industries and using quantile regression to 
examine racial wages by earnings level produced little evidence of reduced market structure–driven racial earnings 
discrimination of females in highly unionized industries. 
8 Specifically, Agesa and Monaco (2006) find substantial evidence of market structure–driven discrimination of nonunion 
workers and that high-wage black nonunion workers experience less market structure–driven discrimination relative to their low-
wage counterparts. 
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Equation (1), are presented to test if wages are more standardized by education level for 
managers in highly unionized industries relative to less-unionized industries. Table 4 provides 
a summary of the returns to education as indicated by the coefficients on the education 
categories in Equation (1). The top portion of Table 4 provides a summary of the returns to 
education categories and their significance for all managers (first row) and managers in high- 
and low-union density industries (second and third row, respectively). It is interesting to 
note that the coefficients on the education dummies are consistently higher for managers in 
low-union density industries relative to managers in high-union density industries. For instance, 
the returns to a high school diploma are 18.2 and 27.2 percentage points more relative to 
managers with less than a high school diploma for managers in high- and low-union density 
industries, respectively. These findings are consistent with the assertion of wage 
standardization in highly unionized industries. 
If we compare the quantile estimates of the returns to education for managers in high- and 
low-union density industries (Table 4, rows 4–6 and 7–10, respectively), the returns to education 
is consistently higher for managers in low-union density industries relative to managers in 
high-union density industries at each quantile. These findings are consistent with our findings 
in the OLS model and provide additional support for the contention of wage standardization in 
highly unionized industries. 9  
We test the robustness of our results. Specifically, a previously mentioned shortcoming of our 
regression specification is the inclusion of broad occupational dummies for each category of 
managers. Particularly, the category “managers and administrators” constituted a very large and 
heterogeneous group of subordinate managers. The heterogeneity of this group may have distorted 
our findings in either direction—suggesting that there is a relationship between market structure 
and discrimination for managers when, in essence, there is not, or diluting the estimated 
relationship. To test this, we reestimate quantile regressions (at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, 
seventy-fifth, and ninetieth quantiles) separately by union density (high- and low-union 
density) and manager category (managers and administrators and all other managers). Our 
findings for each of the two groups reveal a similar pattern as our quantile estimates of the 
entire sample—small and insignificant coefficients for the black*less-competitive interaction 
term for managers at most quantiles in high-union density industries, and large estimates on that 
coefficient in low-union density industries—albeit, the significance of coefficients dramatically 
declines as a result of the drastic reduction in sample size. Moreover, these findings, taken in 
conjunction with previous analyses of market structure–driven discrimination of union and 
nonunion workers (Peoples, 1994), provide support for the notion that standardized union work 
rules and wages offer black workers and managers a sanctuary from market structure–driven 
discrimination. 
 
9 In separate analyses not shown (but available on request), OLS and quantile wage regressions, separate for managers in high- 
and low-union density industries, were run which included both male and female managers. The specifications included a gender 
dummy, as well as the controls in Equation (1). A comparison of the coefficients on the gender dummy for managers in high- and 
low-union density industries allows the test of wage standardization by gender in highly unionized industries. We find evidence 
of smaller gender earnings gaps in highly unionized industries—indicating wage standardization by gender in highly unionized 
industries. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The literature on market structure and earnings discrimination of union and nonunion workers 
provides evidence that unionization protects black workers from market structure–driven earnings 
discrimination (ibid.). This study extends prior research on the role of unionization in altering the 
market structure/racial earnings relationship by examining the relationship for low- and mid-level 
managers. Given that managers routinely are not covered by collective bargaining agreements, a 
formidable way to examine unionization’s role in altering the relationship for this group is to 
estimate the relationship separating managers into those in high- and low-union density 
industries. Moreover, this study seeks to determine if wage standardization in highly unionized 
industries protects black managers from market structure–driven discrimination similarly to the 
way that unionization protects black workers. Further, this study utilizes quantile regression, 
which provides a complete analysis of the market structure/racial earnings relationship for 
managers along the spectrum of earnings levels. 
We find little evidence of market structure–driven discrimination for black managers at various 
earnings levels in highly unionized industries. In fact, only managers at the twenty-fifth quantile 
have a larger earnings gap in less-competitive industries relative to the gap at this quantile in 
competitive industries. Regressions of earnings of managers in low-union density industries that 
utilize measures of central tendency find no evidence of market structure–driven discrimination 
for this group—for in- stance, regressions around the median quantile and OLS evaluated for the 
average manager in low-union density industries each find an insignificant influence of less-
competitive market structure on earnings discrimination. However, quantile regressions evaluated 
at most other quantiles find evidence of market structure–induced discrimination of black 
managers in less-unionized industries. These findings provide evidence of market structure–
driven discrimination for black managers in low-union density industries, and weak evidence 
(only at the twenty-fifth quantile) for their counterparts in highly unionized industries. We also 
find evidence of wage standardization by race, gender, and education in highly unionized 
industries—findings consistent with the contention of less market structure–driven 
discrimination in highly unionized industries. 
Caution is warranted in the interpretation of our results. Specifically, our analysis is limited to 
manufacturing industries and, therefore, our findings are not necessarily indicative of patterns of 
market structure–driven earnings discrimination for the entire labor market. Further, we do not 
account for racial sorting into union employment. Notwithstanding, this study provides evidence 
that the environment of increased racial earnings equality that is created by standardized wages and 
work rules of unionization transcends workers directly protected by collective bargaining 
agreements—in this case, reducing market structure–driven discrimination of black managers at 
most earnings levels in highly unionized industries. 
There are policy implications of our results. Our findings indicate that workers’ unionization 
protects black managers from market structure– induced discrimination; however, unionization 
has declined dramatically in the past three decades (Farber and Western, 2001). Thus, our 
results, taken in conjunction with previous findings that unionization also protects black 
workers from market structure–driven discrimination (Peoples, 1994), indicate that black 
managers and workers are quickly losing a refuge from market structure–driven 
discrimination. Accordingly, increased antidiscriminatory policies may be necessary to combat 
black workers’ and managers’ potentially increased exposure to preference-based, market 
structure–driven discrimination as a result of declining unionization. 
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